
What You’ll Learn
- How the OHS version of risk management narrows the general process: hazards instead of “sources of risk,” risk control instead of “risk treatment,” and one objective — freedom from harm
- Why hazard identification must cover the full Article 100 hazard set, not just the two hazards the standard addresses directly
- The three factors that build likelihood in risk analysis: exposure frequency and duration, the likelihood of the hazardous event, and the likelihood of avoiding or limiting injury
- The equipment-condition questions — including the circuit breaker list — that keep an event-likelihood judgment honest and less subjective
- What risk evaluation actually asks: can the controls already in place reasonably achieve freedom from harm?
The OHS Version: Same Process, Sharper Words
In the occupational health and safety sphere, the same logical, systematic process and the same principles apply — but the focus tightens and the terminology narrows. The OHS objective is stated in four words: freedom from harm — no injury, no damage to health. Sources of risk are called hazards. Analyzing and estimating risk becomes a combination of estimating the likelihood of harm and the severity of that harm. The level of risk is then evaluated against the objective: can it reasonably be concluded that freedom from harm can be achieved, or is further risk treatment required? And risk treatment takes its working name, risk control. That narrowing produces a clean three-step assessment:
- Hazard identification — find, list, and characterize hazards
- Risk analysis — analyze sources, causes, and potential consequences to determine the likelihood of harm, the potential severity of that harm, and estimate the level of risk
- Risk evaluation — determine whether the objective of freedom from harm can reasonably be met by the risk control in place, or whether further risk control is required
Users of NFPA 70E will likely run this inside their own version of an OHS risk management system when conducting the shock and arc flash risk assessments the standard requires. The three steps below are where the work happens.
Step 1: Hazard Identification — The Full Hazard Set
Hazard identification is possibly the simplest step in the process, because the possible source of injury in an electrical safety context is typically obvious. The trap is stopping too early. NFPA 70E addresses two hazards directly — electric shock and arc flash burns — but a risk assessment has to address all the electrical hazards. The Article 100 definition of electrical hazard includes electric shock, arc flash burns, thermal burns, and arc blasts, and the known hazards extend further: flying parts, molten metal, intense light, poisonous oxides, and generated pressure waves. An assessment that lists only shock and arc flash has identified the hazards the standard regulates most directly, not the hazards the worker actually faces. Find them, list them, characterize them — all of them.
Step 2: Risk Analysis — Severity and a Three-Factor Likelihood
Risk analysis is the harder step to define. The level of risk for an identified hazard rests on the severity of the possible injury and the likelihood of that injury occurring, and a qualitative rather than quantitative approach might be necessary to estimate both. Severity is estimated against an outcome scale that runs from reversible injuries, through irreversible injuries, to death — which is why two tasks with identical likelihood can carry very different risk. Likelihood, in turn, is usually built from three factors considered independently:
- The frequency and duration of exposure — how often, and for how long, people are in the hazard’s reach
- The likelihood of a hazardous event occurring — including during use and during foreseeable misuse of the electrical system
- The likelihood of avoiding or limiting injury — what happens between the event and the person
The second factor carries human behavior inside it. Foreseeable characteristics that move the likelihood include stress — from time constraints, work tasks, and perceived damage — and a lack of awareness of information relevant to the hazard; behavior itself is shaped by skill, training, experience, and the complexity of the equipment or process. The third factor is largely a design question: whether the event occurs suddenly or gradually, whether the employee has spatial room to withdraw from the hazard, the nature of the components — touch-safe components, for example, reduce the likelihood of contact with energized parts — and the likelihood of the hazard being recognized in time.
Asking About Condition: The Equipment Question Lists
Subjectivity can have a substantial impact on the result of a risk assessment, so the annex directs that subjective information be minimized as far as reasonably practicable — and its tool for that is questions. When determining the likelihood of a hazardous event, the employer works through the equipment’s actual condition. Does the equipment meet the necessary normal operating conditions? At what point is it in its rated life? Have all connections been verified as appropriately tightened (torqued) to the manufacturer’s requirements or the appropriate industry standard? Is any component, device, or equipment loose or damaged? Does the enclosure have all its bolts and screws installed, and does it have ventilation openings? Is the enclosure arc rated? Are there openings rodents or other vermin could enter? Has the enclosure been examined for moisture, dust, dirt, soot, and grease? And on the human side: what actions can employees take, and what errors might they make?
For circuit breakers, the annex gives a dedicated list. Has the right type of breaker been used, and has it been applied at its marked rating? Have the proper conductor types and sizes been used, and what is the ampere rating? Has the breaker been operated in accordance with the manufacturer’s instructions or standard requirements? Has a calibration sampling program been instituted? Has the breaker interrupted high-fault currents, or repeatedly interrupted fault currents? Has the operating temperature been checked under normal use conditions? Have insulation resistance or individual pole resistance (millivolt drop) tests been performed? Have inverse-time or instantaneous overcurrent trip tests been conducted, and a rated hold-in test? Have accessory devices been tested? Have the surfaces been examined for evidence of overheating, blistering, cracks, dust, dirt, soot, grease, and moisture? Are all the electrical connections clean and secure? Are the external metal parts discolored or flaking, or is the adjacent wiring melting or blistering? If the breaker has interchangeable trip units, are they loose or overheated? Each “no” raises the likelihood that operating that breaker becomes the hazardous event the assessment is trying to price.
Step 3: Risk Evaluation — Can Existing Controls Deliver Freedom from Harm?
Risk evaluation is a determination of whether risk control methods can satisfactorily protect employees from harm. The risk is estimated first, prior to the application of protective measures — and once estimated, all practicable efforts must be made to reduce the risk of injury. Careful consideration of failure modes is an important part of that reduction: both technical failures and behavioral failures that could make the risk reduction ineffective have to be taken into account. Where hazards cannot be eliminated, the answer is typically a balanced approach — controlling access to an electrical system, for example, calls for barriers, awareness placards, safe operating instructions, qualification and training, and PPE together, with initial, refresher, or periodic training required for all affected personnel. Engineering controls alone are not sufficient to reduce the remaining risk to a tolerable level; often, all six levels of the hierarchy of risk control must be used, in some form, to achieve an adequate risk reduction strategy. And the sequence closes the loop: once the assessment is complete and the protective measures are determined, the measures must be implemented prior to initiating electrical work. The exercise might not reduce the PPE required — but it improves understanding of the hazards, and that understanding is what ensures the protective measures are actually implemented properly.
Worked Scenario
A maintenance supervisor is assessing the task of operating and inspecting a lineup of aging circuit breakers in a 480Y/277-volt panelboard. Step 1: she lists the full hazard set — electric shock, arc flash burns, thermal burns, and arc blast, plus flying parts and molten metal if a breaker fails violently. Step 2: the severity side is serious — an arc event at this equipment could produce irreversible injury. For likelihood, she works the three factors. Exposure: the breakers are operated twice a day, every day — frequency and duration are high. Event likelihood: she runs the breaker condition questions and finds trouble — no calibration sampling program, no record of trip testing, two breakers with discolored external metal parts and adjacent wiring showing heat damage, and one enclosure missing bolts. Each answer pushes the event likelihood up. Avoidance: the breakers are dead-front and the operator stands to the side, but the event would be sudden, leaving little room to withdraw. Her level of risk comes out high. Step 3: she evaluates the controls in place — a procedure and arc-rated PPE alone — and concludes they cannot reasonably achieve freedom from harm. Further risk control is required before the work proceeds: the suspect breakers are tested and serviced, the enclosure hardware is restored, a sampling and trip-test program is instituted, and access, training, and PPE controls are layered on — all implemented before the next scheduled operation.
Common Mistakes and Safety Notes
- Identifying only shock and arc flash. Those are the two hazards the standard addresses directly; the Article 100 definition adds thermal burns and arc blasts, and flying parts, molten metal, intense light, poisonous oxides, and pressure waves belong on the list too.
- Building likelihood from one factor. Exposure frequency and duration, event likelihood, and avoidance likelihood are considered independently — a rare task with a likely event can outrank a daily task on healthy equipment.
- Guessing at equipment condition. The question lists exist to displace subjectivity: torque, enclosure hardware, contamination, maintenance and test history are asked, not assumed.
- Ignoring human factors in event likelihood. Stress from time pressure and gaps in hazard awareness are foreseeable characteristics the assessment must address, along with skill, training, experience, and equipment complexity.
- Evaluating controls that exist only on paper. Evaluation asks whether the controls in place can reasonably achieve freedom from harm — and the chosen protective measures must be implemented before work starts, not promised for later.
- Stopping at engineering controls. Where hazards cannot be eliminated, a balanced approach across the hierarchy — access control, placards, instructions, qualification and training, and PPE — is typically what brings remaining risk to a tolerable level.
Summary
The OHS risk assessment runs in three steps against a single objective: freedom from harm. Hazard identification finds, lists, and characterizes every hazard — the full Article 100 set of shock, arc flash burns, thermal burns, and arc blasts, plus flying parts, molten metal, intense light, poisonous oxides, and pressure waves — not just the two hazards the standard addresses directly. Risk analysis estimates the level of risk from severity (reversible injury, irreversible injury, death) and a likelihood built from three independent factors: exposure frequency and duration, the likelihood of the hazardous event, and the likelihood of avoiding or limiting injury — with equipment-condition questions, including the circuit breaker list, keeping the event judgment grounded. Risk evaluation then asks whether the controls in place can reasonably deliver freedom from harm; if not, further risk control, failure modes considered and all six hierarchy levels in play, is required — implemented before the work begins.
Quick-Check Questions
- What is the objective of OHS risk management, and what are hazards called in the general process?
Answer: The objective is freedom from harm — injury or damage to health. In the general process the same items are called sources of risk; OHS terminology calls them hazards. - Why is identifying only electric shock and arc flash burns an incomplete hazard identification?
Answer: Because a risk assessment must address all electrical hazards: the Article 100 definition also includes thermal burns and arc blasts, and known hazards include flying parts, molten metal, intense light, poisonous oxides, and pressure waves. - What three factors are considered independently to determine the likelihood of harm?
Answer: The frequency and duration of exposure; the likelihood of a hazardous event occurring; and the likelihood of avoiding or limiting injury. - Name four questions from the circuit breaker condition list.
Answer: Any four of: right type used; applied at marked rating; proper conductor types and sizes; operation per manufacturer’s instructions; calibration sampling program; interruption of high or repeated fault currents; operating temperature checked; insulation or pole resistance tests; trip tests; hold-in test; accessory devices tested; surfaces examined for overheating/contamination; connections clean and secure; metal parts discolored or wiring heat-damaged; interchangeable trip units loose or overheated. - What question does risk evaluation answer, and what timing rule closes the assessment?
Answer: Whether the risk control in place can reasonably achieve freedom from harm, or whether further risk control is required. The determined protective measures must be implemented prior to initiating electrical work.
Based on NFPA 70E (2024), Informative Annex F, paraphrased for study.
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